The following terms are common to the UAS / UUV industries, general literature, or conferences on UAS/UAV/Drone/UUV systems.
ABM Anti-ballistic missile
A/C Aircraft (Piloted or unmanned) also A/C
ACOUSTIC Detects drones by recognizing unique sounds produced by their motors.
A/D Attack / Defense Scenario Analysis
ADS Air Defense System (USA) / Area Denial System
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast systems
A/C FD Aircraft flood denial
AFRL Air Force Research Lab
A-GPS Assisted GPS
AGL Above ground level
AHI Anomalous Health Incidents
AI Artificial intelligence: “1. a branch of computer science dealing with the
simulation of intelligent behavior in computers, and 2: the capability of a machine
to imitate intelligent human behavior.” (Merriam-Webster, 2020)
AIS Automated Identification System for Collision Avoidance
AMS Autonomous Mobile Sword (SCREAMER) uses sound to disrupt the brain before cutting the enemy to pieces.
AO Area of Operations
AOA Angle of Arrival of signals to GPS receivers / Angle of Attack
APC Armored personnel carrier
APDS Armor-piercing discarding sabot projectile
APFSDS Armor-piercing fin-stabilized discarding sabot projectile
AR Augmented reality
ARW Anti-radiation weapons
ATC Air Traffic Control / Air traffic Control Signals
ATSAW Air Traffic Situational Awareness
AUV Autonomous underwater vehicle
B&B Branch & bound
Bandwidth is Defined as the Range within a band of wavelengths, frequencies, or energy.
Think of it as a range of radio frequencies occupied by a modulated carrier wave, assigned to a service over which a device can operate. Bandwidth is also a capacity for data transfer of electrical communications systems.
BC Ballistic Coefficient
BEAR Battlefield Extraction-Assist Robot
Black Swan Black Swan Event- A black swan is an unpredictable event beyond what is.
Normally expected of a situation and has potentially severe consequences. Black
swan events are characterized by their extreme rarity, severe impact, and the
widespread insistence they were obvious in hindsight.
(Black Swan Definition, 2020)
BLOS Beyond line-of-sight
BPAUV Battlespace Preparation Autonomous Underwater Vehicle
BSL-4 Biosafety Level #
BTWC Biological & Toxin Weapons Convention
BVLOS Beyond Visual Line-of-Sight operations
BVR Beyond visual range
BW Biological weapons
BYOD Bring your device
c Speed of light ~ (3 x 108 m/s) [186,000 miles per sec] in vacuum named after Celeritas, the Latin word for speed or velocity.
C-CLAW Combat Laser assault weapon
cs speed of sound (344 m/s) in air
C2 / C2W Command and control / Command and Control Warfare
C3 Command, control, communications
C3I Command, control, communications, and Intelligence
C4 Command, control, communications, and computers
C4I Command, control, communications and computers, intelligence
C4ISR Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance & reconnaissance
C4ISTAR Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, target
acquisition and reconnaissance
C5I Command, control, communications, computers, Collaboration & Intelligence
CA Collision Avoidance / Clear Acquisition (GPS) / Cyber Assault (aka CyA)
C/A Civilian acquisition code for GPS
CAA Control Acquisition cyber attack
CAS Close Air Support / Common situational awareness
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiation & Nuclear critical infrastructure facilities
CBRNE Chemical, Biological, Radiation, Nuclear & Explosives attacks critical infrastructure facilities or assets
CBRNECy Chemical, Biological, Radiation, Nuclear, Explosives & Cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure facilities or assets
CBW Chemical, Biological Weapons
CC&D Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception
CCTV Closed Circuit Television
CD Charge diameters
Cd Drag coefficient
CDC Center for Disease Control
CDMA Code division multiple access
CD Collective detection maximum likelihood localization approach (Eichelberger, 2019)
CEA Cyber-electromagnetic activities
CEP Circular error probable
CETC Chinese Electronics Technology Group Corporation
CEW Cyber electronic warfare / Communications electronic warfare
CGA Coast Guard Administration – Singapore
CHAMP Counter-Electronics High Power Microwave Advanced Missile Project
CIA Confidentiality, Integrity & Availability ( standard INFOSEC paradigm)
CI / CyI Critical Infrastructure / Cyber Infiltration
CIA Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability / Central Intelligence Agency
CIS Critical Infrastructure Sector
CJNG Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación
CM / CyM Countermeasure / Cyber Manipulation
CMADS China’s Microwave Active Denial System
C/NA Communication / Navigation Aid
CNA Computer network attack
CND Computer network deception
CNE Computer network exploitation
CNO Computer network operations
CNS Central nervous system
COMINT Communications intelligence
COMJAM Communications Jamming
COMINT Communications Intelligence
COMSEC Communications Security
CONOP(S) Concepts of Operations
CONV Convergent Technology Dynamics
CONV-CBRN Convergent Technology Dynamics – Chemical, Biological, Radiation & Nuclear
COP Common operating picture
COTS Commercial off-the-shelf
CPS Cyber-physical systems
CR Conflict Resolution / Close range / Cyber Raid (aka CyR)
CSI Crime scene investigation
CT Counter-Terrorism / Counter-Terrorism Mission
CTN Course time navigation
C-UAS Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (defenses/countermeasures)
CUAV Counter Unmanned Aircraft Vehicle (defenses/countermeasures)
CUES Code for unplanned encounters at sea
CW / CyW Cyber Warfare
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention
CWMD Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Community
CYBER WEAPON – Malicious Software and IT systems that, through ICTS networks,
manipulate, deny, disrupt, degrade, or destroy targeted information systems or
networks. It may be deployed via computer, communications, networks, rogue
access points, USBs, acoustically, electronically, and airborne/underwater
unmanned systems & SWARMS. Alternatively, cyber weapons:
- A campaign that may combine multiple malicious programs for espionage, data theft, or sabotage.
- A stealth capability that enables undetected operation within the targeted system over an extended time.
- An attacker with apparent intimate knowledge of details for the workings of the targeted system.
- A special type of computer code to bypass protective cybersecurity technology.
Definition www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2013/May-June/Myer.html Nov 14, 2013 – 1) danger close is included in the “method-of-engagement” line of a call-for-fire request to indicate that friendly forces are close to the target. … Danger close is a term that is exclusive from risk estimate distance (RED) although the RED for 0.1 percent PI is used to define danger close for aircraft delivery. Pi = Probability of incapacitation. 2) Definition of “danger close” (US DoD) In close air support, artillery, mortar, and naval gunfire support fires, it is the term included in the method of engagement segment of a call for fires which indicates that friendly forces are within close proximity of the target.
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
Dazzle Cause temporary blindness with Laser
DCPA Distance between vessels approaching CPA
D&D Denial & deception
DDD Dull, dangerous, and dirty
D/D/D Destruction, Disruption, Deception
DDOS Distributed Denial of Service cyber attack
DEFCON Defense condition
DEW Directed energy weapons (also, DE)
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency
DUST Dual-use Science & Technology threat
EA Electronic Attack
EBO Effects-based operations
ECCM / EP Electronic counter-countermeasures / Electronic Protection
ECD Dr. Manuel Eichelberger’s advanced implementation of CD to detect & mitigate spoofing attacks on GPS or ADS-B signals (Eichelberger, 2019)
ECM Electronic countermeasures
ELINT Electronic Intelligence
EM Electromagnetic waves
EMC Electromagnetic compatibility
EMD Electromagnetic deception
EMF Electromagnetic field
EMI Electromagnetic interference
EMP Electromagnetic pulse – electromagnetic energy.
EMR Electromagnetic radiation
EMS Electromagnetic spectrum
EO Electro-optical system
EW Electronic warfare[Legacy EW definitions: EW was classically divided into (Adamy D., EW 101 A First Course in Electronic Warfare, 2001):
- ESM – Electromagnetic Support Measures – the receiving part of EW;
- ECM – Electromagnetic Countermeasures – jamming, chaff, flares used to interfere with operations of radars, military communications, and heat-seeking weapons;
- ECCM -Electronic Counter-Counter Measures – measures are taken to design or operate radars or communications systems to counter the effects of ECM.
Not included in the EW definitions were Anti-radiation Weapons (ARW) and Directed Energy Weapons (DEW).
USA and NATO have updated these categories:
- ES – Electronic warfare Support (old ESM) to monitor the R.F. environment;
- EA – Electronic Attack – the old ECM includes ASW and D.E. weapons; to deny, disrupt, deceive, exploit, and destroy adversary electronic systems.
- EP – Electronic Protection – (old ECCM) (Adamy D., EW 101 A First Course in Electronic Warfare, 2001) to guard friendly systems from hostile attacks.
ES is different from Signal Intelligence (SIGINT). SIGINT comprises Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT). All these fields involve the receiving of enemy transmissions. (Adamy D., EW 101 A First Course in Electronic Warfare, 2001)
FAA Federal Aviation Agency
FHSS frequency-hopping spread spectrum
FIRES definition (US DoD – JP 3-0) is the use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target.
FPS Feet Per Second
GS Ground Station
GCS Ground control station
GPS Global Positioning System (US)  (USGPO, 2021)
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System (GPS, GLONASS, Galileo, Beidou & other regional systems)
GNU GNU / Linux Operating system
GPS Global Positioning System / Geo-Fencing
GRU Russian military intelligence branch
GSFD Ground station flood denial
GSM Global system for mobile communications
GTA Ground-to-Air Defense
Hard damage DEW complete vaporization of a target
HAPS High Altitude Platforms (generally for wireless communications enhancements)
HCM Hypersonic cruise missile
HGV Hypersonic glide vehicle
HEAT High-explosive anti-tank warhead
HEL High energy Laser
HOW Hand-over-word satellite data timestamp defined in (IS-GPS-200G, 2013)
HTV Hypersonic test vehicle
HUMINT Human Intelligence
HVM Hostile vehicle mitigation
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IC Intelligence community ~ 17 different agencies
ICBM Intercontinental ballistic missile
ICS Internet Connection Sharing / Industrial control systems
ICT Information & Communications Technology
ICTS Information & Communications Technology Services
ID Information Dominance / Inspection and Identification /Identification
IDEX International Defense Exhibition and Conference
IDS Intrusion detection system
IED Improvised Explosive Device
IFF Identify Friend or Foe
IIIM International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism
IMU Inertial Measurement Unit
IND Improvised nuclear device
INS Inertial navigation system
INFOSEC Information Security
IO /I.O. Information Operations
IoT Internet of things
IIoT Industrial Internet of things
IP Internet protocol
IS Information security / Islamic State
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)
ISR Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance UAS Platform
ISTAR Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance
IT Information Technology
IT/OT Information Technology/ Operational Technology
ITE Installation, Training, Expense
IW Information Warfare
JIM Joint Investigative Mechanism
JSR Jamming-to-signal ratio
KE Kinetic energy
KEW Kinetic energy weapon
K’IHAP Short Shout in Tae Kwon Do
LASER “A laser is a device that emits light through a process of optical amplification based on the stimulated emission of electromagnetic radiation. The term “laser” originated as an acronym for “light amplification by stimulated emission of radiation.” A laser differs from other light sources in that it emits light coherently, spatially, and temporally. Spatial coherence allows a laser to be focused on a tight spot, enabling laser cutting and lithography applications laser cutting and lithography. Spatial coherence also allows a laser beam to stay narrow over great distances (collimation), enabling applications such as laser pointers. Lasers can also have high temporal coherence, which allows them to emit light with a very narrow spectrum, i.e., they can emit a single color of light. Temporal coherence can produce pulses of light as short as a femtosecond. Used: for military and law enforcement devices for marking targets and measuring range and speed.” (Wiki-L, 2018)
LaWS Laser weapon system
LLTR Low-level transit route
LM or L.M. Loitering munitions
LMM Lightweight Multi-role Missiles
LOS Line of sight
LPI Low Probability of Intercept
LRAD Long Range Acoustic Device / Long-Range Area Denial 
Mach 1 Speed of sound, 761.2 mph
MAD Mutually assured destruction
M-ATV Mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicle
MAME Medium altitude medium endurance
MASER Microwave Amplification Stimulated Emission of Radiation
MAST Micro Autonomous Systems & Technology
MEDUSA (Mob Excess Deterrent Using Silent Audio)
MEMS micro-electro-mechanical systems
MIM Man-in-middle attack
MIRV Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles
ML Machine learning
MLAT Multilateration System
MND Ministry of National Defense
MOA Minute of angle in degrees
MOPP Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) Gear
MRVs Multiple Re-entry Vehicles
mTBI mild Traumatic Brain Injury
MTI Moving target indicator
MUM-T Manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T)
NAS National Academy Of Sciences
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEB New Economic Block soldier
NERC North American Electric Reliability Corporation
NDM Navigation data modification spoofing attack
NGO Nongovernmental organization
NIEHS National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences
NKW non-kinetic warfare
NV Neurological vulnerability
OODA Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act decision loops
OPCW Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OPSEC Operational Security
OSINT Open-source intelligence
PETMAN Humanoid robot developed for US Army -Protection Ensemble Test Mannequin
Phigital Digital and human characteristics & patterns overlap
PII Private identifying information and credentials
PLA Peoples Liberation Army ( Chinese)
PLAN Peoples Liberation Army & Navy (Chinese)
POV Point of view
PRN Pseudo-Random Noise
PSYOPS Psychological warfare operations
RC Radio communications signals
RCS Radar cross-section
RDD Radiological dispersion device
RF Radio Frequency
RF-EMF Radiofrequency – Electromagnetic field
RFID Radio-frequency identification (tags)
RID Remote identification of ID
RIMPAC Tim of the Pacific
RN Ryan-Nichols Qualitative Risk Assessment
RNRA Ryan – Nichols Attack / Defense Scenario Risk Assessment for Cyber cases
ROA Remotely operated aircraft
ROC Republic of China
ROV/ROUV Remote operating vehicle / Remotely operated underwater vehicle
RPA Remotely piloted aircraft
RPAS Remotely piloted system
RPV Remotely piloted vehicle
RSS Received signal strength
RV Re-entry vehicle
SA Situational Awareness
SAA Sense and Avoid
SAM Surface to Air missile
SAR Synthetic aperture radar
SATCOM Satellite communications
SBLM Submarine-launched ballistic missile
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems
SCS Shipboard control system (or station) / Stereo Camera System / South China Seas
SDR Software-defined radio
SEAD Suppression of enemy defenses
SECDEF Secretary of Defense (USA)
SIC Successive Signal Interference Cancellation
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
Signature UAS detection by acoustic, optical, thermal, and radio /radar
SMART Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
S/N S / N = is one pulse received signal to noise ratio, dB: Signal to Noise ratio at HAPS receiver (also, SNR)
Soft damage DEW disruption to a UAS computer
SOCOM U.S. Army Special Operations Command
SOLAS Safety of Life at Sea (International Maritime Convention) [safety conventions]
Spoofing is A Cyber-weapon attack that generates false signals to replace valid ones. GPS Spoofing is an attack to provide false information to GPS receivers by broadcasting counterfeit signals similar to the original GPS signal or by recording the original GPS signal captured somewhere else at some other time and then retransmitting the signal. The Spoofing Attack causes GPS receivers to provide the wrong information about position
and time. (T.E. Humphrees, 2008) (Tippenhauer & et.al, 2011)
Spoofing Alt Def: A Cyber-weapon attack generates false signals to replace valid ones.
SSBN Strategic nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine
SSLT Seamless satellite-lock takeover spoofing attack
sUAS Small Unmanned Aircraft System
SWARM High level, a dangerous collaboration of UAS, UUV, or unmanned boats
Taiwan ROC Taiwan is officially the Republic of China
TCAS Traffic collision avoidance system
ToF Time of flight
TTFF Time to first fix (latency)
TDOA time difference of arrival
TEAM (UAS) High-level, a dangerous collaboration of UAS, UUV, or unmanned boats; differs from SWARM in that it has a UAS Team Leader (TL) where SWARM does not. TL directs the UAS team and is the primary counter UAS target to disrupt.
TDOA Time difference of arrival
TO Theater of Operations
TOA Time of arrival
TRANSEC Transmission security
TTPs Tactic, Technique, and Procedures
Tx Transmit signal
UA Unmanned Aircraft (non-cooperative and potential intruder)
UAM Urban Air Mobile (vehicle)
UAS Unmanned aircraft system
UAS-p UAS pilot
UAV Unmanned aerial vehicle / Unmanned autonomous vehicle.
UAV-p UAV pilot
UCAR Unmanned combat armed rotorcraft
UCARS UAV common automated recovery system
UCWA / UA Unintentional cyber warfare attack
UGCS Unmanned Ground Control Station
UGS Unmanned ground-based station
UGT Unmanned ground transport
UGV Unmanned ground vehicle
UHF Ultra-high frequency
USV Unmanned Surface Vessel
UUV Unmanned underwater vehicle
VR Virtual reality
VLOS visual line of sight
VTOL Vertical take-off and landing
VX Deadly nerve agent
WFOV Wide field of view
WFUL Wake Forrest University Laboratory
WLAN Wide Local area network
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
WMDD Mini-Weapons of Mass Destruction and Disruption
Asymmetric warfare can describe a conflict in which the resources of two belligerents differ in essence and, in the struggle, interact and attempt to exploit each other’s characteristic weaknesses. Such struggles often involve strategies and tactics of unconventional warfare, the weaker combatants attempting to use strategy to offset deficiencies in quantity or quality of their forces and equipment. (Thomas, 2010) Such strategies may not necessarily be militarized. (Steponova, 2016)
This contrasts with symmetric warfare, where two powers have comparable military power and resources and rely on similar tactics, differing only in details and execution. (Thomas, 2010)
Acquisition – Acquisition is the process in a GPS receiver that finds the visible satellite signals and detects the delays of the PRN sequences and the Doppler shifts of the signals.
Circular Cross-Correlation (CCC) – In a GPS classical receiver, the circular cross-correlation is a similarity measure between two vectors of length N, circularly shifted by a given displacement d:
Cxcorr (a, b , d) = ∑ ai dot bI + d mod N
The two vectors are most similar at the displacement d, where the sum (CCC value) is maximum. The vector of CCC values with all N displacements can be efficiently computed by a fast Fourier transform (FFT) in Ớ ( N log N ) time. (Eichelberger, 2019)
Coarse-Time Navigation (CTN) is a snapshot receiver localization technique measuring sub-millisecond satellite ranges from correlation peaks, like classical GPS receivers. (IS-GPS-200G, 2013) [See also expanded definition above.]
Collective Detection (CD) is a maximum likelihood snapshot receiver localization method, which does not determine the arrival time for each satellite, but rather combines all the available information and decides only at the end of the computation. This technique is critical to the (Eichelberger, 2019) invention to mitigate spoofing attacks on GPS or ADS-B.
Coordinate System – A coordinate system uses an ordered list of coordinates to uniquely describe the location of points in space. The meaning of the coordinates is defined concerning some anchor points. The point with all coordinates being zero is called the origin. [ Examples: terrestrial, Earth-centered, Earth-fixed, equator, meridian longitude, latitude, geodetic latitude, geocentric latitude, and geoid. 
DEW Energy SPREAD and Loss in Propagation – There are two types of energy losses in propagation: the spreading of energy such that it does not interact with the target and the wasting of energy in interactions with a physical medium, such as the atmosphere, through which it passes to destroy the target. Type one occurs whether the weapon or target is located on earth or in the vacuum of space. Type two occurs primarily when a weapon or target lies within the atmosphere. (Nielsen, 2012)
DEW Propagation loss – There is always some loss of energy during propagation. The DEW must deliver more energy than needed to damage the target to compensate for the loss along the way. DE weapon design depends on the anticipated target, determining the energy required for damage. Second, the anticipated scenario (range, environment, time, etc. This determines how much energy must be produced to ensure that adequate energy is delivered in the time available. (Nielsen, 2012)
Fluence is the energy per area or (Joules / cm2) necessary to damage a target. (Nielsen, 2012)
Intensity is the power per area (Watt / cm2) necessary to damage a target. (Nielsen, 2012)
Localization – Process of determining an object’s place concerning some reference, usually coordinate systems. [aka Positioning or Position Fix]
Microwave Weapon – A device that damages a target by emitting focused microwaves. The critical word in the definition is “damage.” (Monte, 2021)Navigation Data is the data transmitted from satellites, including orbit parameters to determine the satellite locations, timestamps of signal transmission, atmospheric delay estimations, and status information of the satellites and GPS, such as the accuracy and validity of the data. (IS-GPS-200G, 2013) 
Pseudo-Random Noise (PRN) sequences are pseudo-random bit strings. Each GPS satellite uses a unique PRN sequence with a length of 1023 bits for its signal transmissions. aka as Gold codes, they have a low cross-correlation with each other. (IS-GPS-200G, 2013)
Propagation – delivery of energy to a DEW target.
Snapshot GPS Receiver- A snapshot receiver is a GPS receiver that captures one or a few milliseconds of raw GPS signal for a location fix. (Diggelen, 2009)
DEW Weapon – Weapons may be understood as devices that deposit energy on targets. The energy that must be deposited to achieve a given level of damage is relatively insensitive to the type of weapon employed. Nuclear weapons may be characterized by megatons, bullets in terms of muzzle velocity, and particle beams in terms of amperes of current. Still, when reduced to common units for the energy absorbed by the target, similar levels of damage are achieved at similar levels of energy deposited. (Nielsen, 2012)
Radiological Weapon – a radiological weapon means any device other than a manufactured nuclear explosive, specifically designed to employ radioactive material by disseminating it via crude explosion, aerosol, injection, dispersion, or aerial spraying to cause human destruction, damage, or injury, employing the emitted gamma or beta radiation over the years produced by the decay of such material. (McCreight R., Convergent Technology and Future Strategic Threat, 2013) (McCreight M. S., 2020)
False Flag Operation – organized spreading of misinformation or disinformation.
Specific to Chapter 14, Satellite Killers
Classification of Satellites
Satellites are classified in terms of their purpose and are classified as follows:
Astronomical satellites – observation of distant planets and galaxies;
Biosatellites – carry living organisms to aid scientific experiments;
Communication satellites – communications satellites use geosynchronous or Low Earth orbits to communicate with each other and other systems;
Earth observation satellites are satellites intended for non-military uses such as environmental monitoring, meteorology, and producing maps;
Killer satellites are designed to destroy warheads, satellites, and space-based objects;
Navigational satellites use radio time signals transmitted to enable mobile receivers on the ground to determine their exact location. The relatively clear line of sight between the satellites and receivers on the ground allows satellite navigation systems to measure location to accuracies on the order of a few meters in real-time;
Reconnaissance satellites are communications satellites deployed for military or intelligence applications;
Recovery satellites provide a recovery of reconnaissance, biological, space-production, and other payloads from orbit to Earth;
Space stations are orbital structures designed for human beings to live in space. A space station is distinguished from other crewed spacecraft by its lack of major propulsion or landing facilities. Space stations are designed for medium-term living in orbit;
Tether satellites are connected to another satellite by a thin cable called a tether; and
Weather satellites are used to monitor Earth’s weather and climate.
The most common type of orbit is a geocentric orbit, with over 3,000 active artificial satellites orbiting the Earth. Geocentric orbits may be further classified by their altitude, inclination, and eccentricity.
The commonly used altitude classifications of the geocentric orbit are Low Earth Orbit (LEO), Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO), and High Earth Orbit (HEO). Low Earth Orbit is any orbit below 2,000 km, Medium Earth Orbit is any orbit between 2,000 and 36,000 km, and High Earth Orbit is greater than 36,000 km (Figure 14.2).
A galactocentric orbit is an orbit around the center of a galaxy.
A heliocentric orbit is an orbit around the Sun. In our Solar System, all planets, comets, and asteroids are in such orbits, as are many artificial satellites and pieces of space debris.
Geocentric orbit is an orbit around Earth, such as the Moon or artificial satellites. Currently, there are over 2,500 active artificial satellites orbiting the Earth.
Low Earth Orbit (LEO): Geocentric orbits ranging in altitude from 180 km – to 2,000 km;
Medium Earth Orbit (MEO): Geocentric orbits ranging in altitude from 2,000 km – to 20,000 km;
Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO): Geocentric circular orbit with an altitude of 36,000 km. The orbit period equals one sidereal day, which coincides with the Earth’s rotation period. The speed is 3,075 m/s (10,090 ft/s).
High Earth orbit (HEO): Geocentric orbits above the altitude of a geosynchronous orbit (GEO) > 36,000 km (~ 40,000 km).
SOURCES plus Bibliography below: (Nichols R. K., Unmanned Aircraft Systems In the Cyber Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets. 2nd Ed. Manhattan, KS: New Prairie Press., 2019) and (Nichols R. et al., Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Technologies, and Operations, 2020) (Nichols & et al., 2020) (Nichols & et al., 2020) (Nichols & et al., 2020)
Austin, R, (2010) Unmanned Aircraft Systems: UAVS Design, Development, and Deployment, West Sussex, UK: Wiley, [Condensed with additions from eleven-page “Units and Abbreviations Table.” Pp. ix-xxix] Additional sources generated from / specific to Chapter development / discussion. A few definitions are taken from Wikipedia.
Cyber terminology from Nichols, R. K. (Sept. 5, 2008) Cyber Counterintelligence & Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) Needs – Talking Points & (Randall K. Nichols J. J., 2018) & (Nichols R. K., Hardening US Unmanned Systems Against Enemy Counter Measures, 2019) & (Randall K. Nichols D., Chapter 20 Acoustic CM & IFF Libraries V SWARMS Rev 1 05142019, 2018) & (Randall K. Nichols and Lekkas, 2002)& (NIST, September 2012)
Alford, L. D., Jr., USAF, Lt. Col. (2000) Cyber Warfare: Protecting Military Systems Acquisition Review Quarterly, spring 2000, V.7, No. 2, P, 105, (Nielsen, 2012)
Nichols, Randall K.; Mumm, Hans C.; Lonstein, Wayne D.; Ryan, Julie J.C.H.; Carter, Candice; and Hood, John-Paul, “Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain” (2019). NPP eBooks. 27. https://newprairiepress.org/ebooks/27
Appendix 1: Standard Acoustic Principal Physical Properties (Entokey, 2019)
and (Gelfand, 2009)
A majority of the technical abbreviations come from (Nichols R. K. et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain, 2019) and (Nichols R. al., Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Technologies, and Operations, 2020) (Nichols & et al., 2020) (Nichols R.et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in Cyber Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets, 2nd Edition, 2019) (Nichols R. K., Chapter 14: Maritime Cybersecurity, 2021) (Nichols & Sincavage, Disruptive Technologies with Applications in Airline, Marine, and Defense Industries, 2021) (Nichols & Ryan, Unmanned Vehicle Systems & Operations on Air, Sea & Land, 2020)
Other definitions from the following references:
(Seoul), B. T. (2018, November 27). RF-EMF Exposure. Retrieved from Published online 2018 Nov 27. DOI: 10.4062/biomolther.2018.152: doi: 10.4062/biomolther.2018.152
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Adamy, D. -0. (2015). EW 104 EW Against a New Generation of Threats. Boston: Artech House.
Adamy, D. (2001). EW 101 A First Course in Electronic Warfare. Boston, MA: Artech House.
Adamy, D. (2001). EW 101: A First Course in Electronic Warfare. Boston: Artech House.
Adamy, D. (2004). EW 102 A Second Course in Electronic Warfare. Boston: Artech House.
Adamy, D. (2009). EW 103 Tactical Battlefield Communications Electronic Warfare. Boston: Artech House.
Adamy, D. (2009). EW 103 Tactical Battlefield Communications Electronic Warfare. Boston, MA: Artech House.
Adamy, D. (2015). EW Against a New Generation of Threats. Boston: Artech House.
Adamy, D. L. (2009). EW 103: Tactical Battlefield Communications Electronic Warfare. Norwood, MA: Artech House.
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Adamy, D. L. (2021). Space Electronic Warfare. Norwood, MA: Artech House.
Adamy, D.-9. (1998, Jan). Lesson 4: the basic link for all EW functions. (electronic warfare)(EW Reference & Source Guide). Journal of Electronic Defense, Jan 1998 Issue.
Arar, S. (2022, Feb 9). All About Circuits Understanding. Retrieved from www.allaboutcircuits.com/technical: HTTPs://www.allaboutcircuits.com/technical
Army, U. (1992, November 23). US Army Field Manual FM 34-40-7. Communications Jamming Handbook.
Army, U. (2014). FM 3-38 Cyber Electromagnetic Activities. Washington: DoD.
Army, U. (April 7, 2000). Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare – Joint Pub 3-51. Washington: DoD.
Askin, O. I. (2015). Cyberwarfare and electronic warfare integration in the operational environment of the future: cyber, electronic warfare. . Cyber Sensing 2015 (14 May 2015) (pp. Proceedings Vol 9458, Cyber Sensing 2015; 94580H (2015) SPIE Defense + Security, 20). Washington: Askin, O., Irmak, R, and Avseyer, M. (14 May 2015) Cyber warfare and electronic war 94580H (2015) SPIE Defense + Security, 20.
Ball, M. (2020, January 13). The Metaverse: What It Is, Where to Find It, and Who Will Govern it. Retrieved from https://www.matthewball.vc/all/themetaverse/: https://www.matthewball.vc/all/themetaverse/Jan 13, 2020
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 ECCM was considered T.S. classified with most secret protocols and design algorithms. TS = Top Secret
 EW, E.S., E.P., E.A. definitions were adjusted via (Adamy D., EW 101 A First Course in Electronic Warfare, 2001)to align with our UAS weapons deployment theme.
 GPS consists of at least 24 satellites orbiting around the Earth at approximately 20,000 km above the surface, circling the Earth twice a day, continuously transmitting its location and time code. Localization is done in space and time. GPS provides location and time information to receivers anywhere on Earth where at least four satellite signals can be received. Line of sight (LOS) between receiver and satellite is advantageous. GPS signals take between 64 and 89 ms to reach Earth. GPS works poorly indoors, with reflections, close to thick obstructions, and below trees in canyons. Orbits are precisely determined by GCS, optimized for a high number of concurrently visible satellites above the horizon at any place on Earth.
 LRAD = Long Range Acoustic Device (Chapter 13) / Long-Range Area Denial (Chapter 11)
 All Definitions are taken from (Eichelberger 2019) unless otherwise noted.
 Ớ = Order of magnitude; dot = dot product for vectors
 All these systems are discussed in Chapter 2 of (Eichelberger, 2019)
 Each satellite has a unique 1023-bit PRN sequence, plus some current navigation data, D. Each bit is repeated 20 times for better robustness. The navigation data rate is limited to 50 bit / s. This also limits sending timestamps every 6 seconds and satellite orbit parameters (function of the satellite location over time) only every 30 seconds. As a result, the latency of the first location estimates after turning on a classic receiver, called the time to first fix(TTFF), can be high.