Table of Contents
BACKBONE- TOC
Front Matter
Abstract
Title Page
Copyright /Publication Page
Books also By Randall K. Nichols
Disclaimers
Dedication
Foreword
Preface
Acknowledgements
List of Contributors
Abbreviations and Acronyms
Table of Contents
Table of Figures
Table of Tables
Table of Equations
BOOK SECTIONS / CHAPTERS
SECTION 1: Counter-UAS (C-UAS) Operations as a Concept
Chapter 1: The Role of Information Technology [Ryan]
Student Learning Objectives
Introduction
Disrupting the Decision Cycles
Conceptualizing the Information Systems in UASs
Internal
Boundary systems
External
How Complex information Technologies Are Used in UAS operations
Decision Support Systems
Expert Systems
AI
Implications for C-UAS Operations
How Sensing is Used to Support UAS Operations
Summary
Questions For Reflection
References
Chapter 2: Understanding C-UAS Purpose and Process [Carter]
Introduction
Driving Forces for Increasing the Demand For C-UAS
C-UAS and the Fourth Industrial Revolution
Disruptive Technologies that will innovate the future of C-UAS
The Need for Innovation of C-UAS UAS and C-UAS Qualify as The New Global Arms Race
Conclusions
References
Chapter 3: Developing a C-UAS Strategy, Goals, Options, Target Analysis, Process Selection, Operational Metrics, Approaches to Countering UAS Activities (First Principles) [Mumm]
History
C-UAS Analysis Framework
- Analyzing the Threat
Understanding the Purpose and Weaponization of the Threat
Understanding the Aerodynamics of the Threat
Understanding the Air Vehicle Design of the Threat
Is it One Drone or Multiple Drones?
Understanding the Navigation
- Solution Limitations
Frequency Limitations
Global Governance
Legal Ramifications
Atmospheric Limitations
- Developing a Counter-drone Response
Range
Detection
- Interdiction
Small Drones
Medium Drones
Large Drones
Case Study
Background
Creating a Solution
Analyzing the Threat:
Toofan Drone
Quds-1 Missile
Potential DIANA Missile Usage
Solution Limitations
Preservation of Existing Infrastructure
Governance
Atmospheric Limitations
A Multi-Layered Counter Drone Response Plan
Detection
Interdiction
Integration
The Chosen Solution:
Outer Layer
Inner Layer
Command and Control
Conclusion
Questions
Acronyms
References
Chapter 4: Planning for Resiliency and Robustness [Ryan]
Student Learning Objectives
Understanding the Difference between Resiliency and Robustness
Resiliency
Robustness
Comparing Resiliency and Robustness
Operational Aspects of Resiliency and Robustness
Measuring Resiliency and Robustness
How Processes can Boost Resiliency and Robustness
When Resiliency and Robustness is More Costly than Optimal
When Resiliency and Robustness are Attacked
Types of Attacks
Cascading Effect Potential
The Role of Secrecy
Operational Secrecy
Capability Secrecy
Resiliency and Robustness Secrecy
Questions for Reflection
References
SECTION 2: C-UAS Technologies and Processes
Chapter 5: Surveillance and Reconnaissance [Mumm]
Student Learning Objectives
History-What is it and Why Does it Matter?
Threat Identification-How and Why
Radio Frequency (RF)
Electro-Optical Sensors-Full Motion Video Cameras
Infrared Sensors (IR)
Acoustic Sensors for C-UAS
It’s a Big Sky-How Can We Discern the Clutter from the UAS?
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B)-Helping to Eliminate the “Good Guy” from C-UAS Surveillance and Reconnaissance Challenge
The Difficulty of Differentiating Harmless Aircraft from Threat Aircraft in the C-UAS Space
New Challenges Require New Thinking-Combined Sensors
Mission Planning Secrecy – Protecting the Data
Mission Planning for C-UAS for Perimeter Protection
Conclusions
Questions
References
Chapter 6: C-UAS Evolving Methods of Interdiction [Carter]
Student Learning Objectives
Why is Interdiction Needed?
What is a Blockchain?
The Process of Blockchain Synchronization
Blockchain Aircraft Communication
Blockchain Vulnerabilities
Blockchain Unmanned Aircrafts
U.S. Unmanned Aircraft Patents
Countering a Blockchain Unmanned Aircraft Attack
Next Counter -UAS Hurdle – 5G Communication, Blockchain, Unmanned Aircrafts
Challenges Facing Interdiction Methods for C-UAS
Conclusions
References
Endnote
Chapter 7: UAS Area / Airspace Denial [Hood]
Student Learning Objectives
Key Concepts
Recent Rise in A2-AD Ideologies and Challenges
Anti-Access Challenges
Area-Denial Challenges
Case Study: Countering Growing Chinese A2/AD in the Indo Pacific Region
Integrated Air Defense System (IADS)
Understanding Emerging Vulnerable Gap
Russian A2AD Case Study
Current C-UAS A2AD Civil Applications
Conclusions
References
Supplemental Readings
Chapter 8: Emerging Interdiction Technologies [Hood]
Student Learning Objectives
Hypersonic Threats
Hypersonic Countermeasures
Directed Energy Weapons
Extreme Long-Range Cannon
Cyber-Enabled IADS
Big Data and Artificial Intelligence Integration
Conclusions
References
Supplemental Readings
Chapter 9: Non- Kinetic: Military Avionics, EW, CW, DE, SCADA Defenses [Nichols]
Student Objectives
What Is the Counter -UAS Problem?
Operational Protection from Hostile UAS Attacks – A Helicopter View
Countering UAS Air Threats
Vulnerabilities Perspective
Conventional Vulnerabilities of Air Defense Systems (ADS), Attacks By sUAS and Countermeasures
Conventional Countermeasures Against sUAS /UAS
Aggressor Counter-Countermeasures Specific to UAS Deployment – SWARM
Implications from Attack by Iran on Saudi Arabian Oil Fields
Military Avionics
Military Aviation Roles
P-3 Orion MPA Example
Saab Swordfish MPA
MQ-4C Triton BAMS MPA UAS
C-UAS Premise
Effects of Directed Energy (DE) Weapons (EDEW)
Energy required for damage
Ice Cube
10,000 Joules
Energy Alone Sufficient for Hard Damage?
Energy Delivery Rate
Implications
Energy Losses in Propagation
Directed Energy (DE) Counter Weapons, High-Powered Microwave (HPM) Defenses, High-Power Lasers (HPL)
Raytheon announces delivery of first laser counter-UAS system to U.S. Air Force
Modern Communication Threats to UAS
Information Operations (IO) and the part EW plays
Autonomy vs. Automation
Commercial Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS) Overview
Specifications affecting hostile UAS operations
Airborne Sensing Systems
Sensor Parameters
SCADA
Attack Vectors
Cyber – Attack Taxonomy
Software – Based Vulnerabilities
Hardware-based Vulnerabilities
Electronic Warfare (EW) – UAS Purview
Communication Links for UAS are critical and must be secured
Main Contention
Communications Jamming -UAS
Jammer-to-Signal Ratio
Drone gun – Chinese alternative
Radar Range Equation
Complex RADAR / RES Simulations
Conclusions
Discussion Question
References
Appendix 9-1 Tri-band Anti Drone Rifle KWT-FZQ/DG10-A
Functions and features
Appendix 9-2 MQ-4C Triton design features
Mission capabilities of MQ-4C Triton BAMS UAS
Payloads of Northrop’s unmanned system
Ground control station
Appendix 9-3: J/S Calculation Example
SECTION 3: Counter C-UAS
Chapter 10: When the Other Side Fights Back – Cyberwarfare, Direct Energy Weapons, Acoustics, Integrating C-UAS into Planning [Nichols]
Student Objectives
What Happens When the Enemy Decides to Fight Back?
First Actions
Regulations
Practical Aviation Security in USA
Security Implications of UAV Operations (5 major threats)
Important Changes in Electronic Warfare
Cyberwarfare Purview
Cyber vs EW Battlespace (Parallels)
EMS Environment
NATO – EME, EMO
DE Weapons
Kinetic Energy Weapons (KEW)
Lasers
Microwave Target Interaction
Particle Beams
PB Target Implications (especially large UAS)
Acoustic Countermeasures and Building Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) Acoustic Libraries
Revisiting the C-UAS Problem
Problem Solution
Sound as a Weapon and Countermeasure
Essentials of Audiology
Detection Signatures
Designing a UAS for Stealth
Acoustic Signature Reductions
Audiology Fundamentals
Acoustic waves and Sound Waves in Air
Intensity and Inverse Square Law
The Nature of Sound
Other Parameters of Sound waves
Complex waves
Standing Waves and Resonance
MEMS
Resonance Effects on MEMS
Resonance Tuning
What is the “so what” for Acoustics?
What is an Acoustical attack on the UAS Gyroscope?
Countermeasures for Acoustic attack on Gyroscope
In terms of UAS Countermeasures, why are Acoustics so important
What are the Acoustic Detection Issues?
Is Acoustic Quieting possible?
How has the Long-Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) used as a sonic weapon
UAS Collaboration – SWARM
South Korean experiment
Noise
Real World C-UAS
Chinese CH7
Russian Okhotnik aka “Hunter Drone”
The Iranian Shahed 129
The Israeli Tactical Heron
USA Predator C Avenger
Conclusions
Discussion Questions
References
Appendix 10-1: Standard Acoustic Principal Physical Properties
Chapter 11: Thinking Like the Enemy: Seams in the Zone [Lonstein]
Student Learning Objectives:
Students Will Be Able To:
Preliminary Statement
Keeping it Simple
History as a Guide
Hiding in Plain Sight; Distinguishing the Attacker from the Hobbyist
Scenario:
Vulnerability Axis 1: Familiarity
Attacker Perspective
Vulnerability Axis 2: Environmental Concealability
Attacker Perspective
Vulnerability Axis 3: Conformity with Regulation.
Attacker Perspective
Vulnerability Axis 4: Adapting Appearance to Attract Susceptible Targets
Attacker Perspective
Vulnerability Axis 5: Attraction – Distraction – Stealth
Attacker Perspective
Vulnerability Avis 6: A Studious Attacker
Attacker Perspective
Vulnerability More Than a Seam – A Gaping-hole
The Information Age – A Tool for Attackers
Rapid Advancements in Technology -Amplified Vulnerability
Conclusions
Questions:
References
SECTION 4: Legal and Administrative Issues
Chapter 12: C-UAS Regulation, Legislation & Litigation from A Global Perspective [Lonstein]
Student Learning Objectives
Once Completed Students Should
Current C-UAS Regulatory Landscape
Can C-UAS Be Regulated? The C-UAS Fable
Other Considerations – Self Defense
Conclusions
Questions to Consider
References
References
Adamy, D. (2001). EW 101 A First Course in Electronic Warfare. Boston, MA: Artech House.
Barnes, D. E. (2019, September 23). The Urgent Search for a Cyber Silver Bullet against Iran. Retrieved from New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/23/world/middleeast/iran-cyberattack-us.html
Fazzini, K. (2019, September 22). Saudi Aramco Attacks could Predict widespread cyber warfare from Iran. Retrieved from CNBC: https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/21/saudi-aramco-attacks-could-predict-cyber-warfare-from-iran.html
Gelfand, S. A. (2009). Essentials of Audiology, 3rd Edition. Stuttgart, DE: Thieme.
LRAD Corporation. (2019, October 18). Product sheet LRADS 1000x. Retrieved from LRAD Corporation : https://lradx.com/lrad_products/lrad-1000xi/
Nichols, R. K., Mumm, H. C., Lonstein, W. D., Ryan, J. J., & and Carter, C. (2018). Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the Cyber Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets. Manhattan, KS: New Prairie Press (NPP) eBooks. 21.
Nichols, R. K., Mumm, H. C., Lonstein, W. D., Ryan, J. J., Carter, C., & and Hood, J.-P. (2019). Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain. Manhattan, KS: NPP eBooks. 27.
Nicole Gaouette, K. L. (2019, September 21). US to send troops and air and missile defense to Saudi Arabia as Trump announces new Iran sanctions after oil attack. Retrieved from CNN Politics: https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2019/09/20/politics/trump-announces-iran-sanctions/index.html
Taghvaee, B. (2017, July 27). Shahed 129 Heads Iran’s Armed UAV Force. Retrieved from Aviation Week & Space Technology: https://aviationweek.com/defense/shahed-129-heads-iran-s-armed-uav-force
Tucker, W. (2019, September 23). Saudi Oil Facilities Attack has created International Risks. Retrieved from Inhomelandsecurity.com: https://inhomelandsecurity.com/saudi-oil-facilities-attack-has-created-international-risks/
