8 Bio-Threats to Agriculture-Solutions from Space (Sincavage, Carter, Nichols)

Student Objectives

• To introduce common bioterrorism definitions, animal diseases, human diseases, and zoonoses.
• To recognize that biological attacks on agriculture can be low-tech, high-impact bioterrorism.
• What are the five potential targets of agricultural bioterrorism?
• Describe two ways remote sensing can be used to identify agricultural threats to crops.
• How can satellite observations predict vulnerable targets conducive to plants and livestock?

Definitions

Agroterrorism is a subset of bioterrorism and is defined as the deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease to generate fear, causing economic losses and/or undermining stability. (O.S. Cupp, 2004)

Bioterrorism is the threat or use of biological agents by individuals or groups motivated by political, religious, ecological, or other ideological objectives.

Earth Observation Epidemiology or tele-epidemiology is defined as ‘using space technology with remote sensing in epidemiology. (Wiki, 2022)

MASINT – Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) is a technical branch of intelligence gathering that detect, track, identify or describe the distinctive characteristics (signatures) of fixed or dynamic target sources. This often includes radar, acoustic, nuclear, chemical, and biological intelligence. MASINT is scientific and technical intelligence derived from the analysis of data obtained from sensing instruments to identify any distinctive features associated with the source, emitter, or sender, to facilitate the latter’s measurement and identification. (Wiki, 2022)

OSI, short for OPEN-SOURCE Intelligence (also known as OSINT), is defined as any intelligence produced from publicly available information that is collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to an appropriate audience to address a specific intelligence requirement. (Bazzell, 2021)

Remote Sensing (RS) uses non-ground-based imaging systems to obtain information about processes and events on Earth. It is unique among the detection and diagnostic methods discussed herein in its ability to offer passive monitoring for the disease at scale rather than active sampling. (Silva & et.al, 2021)

Introduction

Bio-threats to agricultural resources are commonly natural. However, rival governments, terrorists, and rogue actors can target critical agricultural infrastructure. The deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease to generate fear, cause economic losses, and/or undermine stability is known as Agroterrorism, a subset of bioterrorism. (O.S. Cupp, 2004)

Terrorist groups may be motivated to attack plants, animals, or agricultural products to attract attention to a cause, incite fear, disrupt society, or demonstrate a capability to exact political concessions. Others may be prompted by motives such as economic interest, sabotage, or revenge (Ban, 2000). In the event of an agroterrorism attack, keeping the biological incursion from inflicting significant damage to human health and the economy will depend heavily on quick alerts to farmers and disease specialists.

Currently, satellite and sensor technologies are revolutionizing crop and livestock disease detection. These technologies can be used individually or in combination to support agricultural surveillance and communication to assist and mitigate threats on the ground. Satellite imaging detects the distinct environmental conditions that may serve as a refuge for the disease-carrying animals. Electromagnetic spectra also provide useful information to make decisions regarding plant physiological stress. In a captured image, plant disease is identified by observing the physiological disturbances caused by foliar reflectance in a near-infrared portion of the spectrum.

Diseases have a Significant Negative impact on Agricultural Productivity.

The burden of agriculture on endemic and naturally imported epidemic diseases is high. It confirms the capacity of animal and plant diseases to cause economic harm. The United States is free of many significant global livestock diseases because of effective surveillance of herds and imports and aggressive eradication campaigns. (Howard, 2013) In general, losses from animal disease account for 17% of the production costs of animal products in the developed world and twice that amount in the developing world.

The cost of crop diseases to the US economy has been estimated to be more than $30 billion / year. The costs include reducing quantity (bushels/acre) and quality (blemished fruit, toxins in grain) yield, short-term control costs, pesticides, and long-term management and harvesting. (Howard, 2013)

What are the Agriculture, Livestock, and Companion Animal Weapons?

The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) and The Center for Food Security and Public Health (CFSPH) have developed some serious wallcharts about Agriculture and Zoonotic Bioterrorism. These wallcharts  portray the threats that must be considered in every risk assessment to develop detection, mitigation, and recovery countermeasures.

The Center for Food Security and Public Health (CFSPH) at Iowa State University has developed two charts titled “Animal Disease From Potential Bioterrorist Agents” that show the CDC Category, (A-C) the severity (mild, moderate, severe) of disease in potentially affected species  [cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, horses, dogs, cats, birds and other], incubation period and prominent clinical signs. (CFSPH, 2022) All of the charted diseases and agents in these charts have technical fact sheets and they may be found at: (Spickler, 2022)

The Center for Food Security and Public Health (CFSPH) at Iowa State University has developed two charts titled “Human Disease From Potential Bioterrorist Agents” that show the CDC Category (A-C), route of transmission, potential body system affected (Septicemia, Respiratory, Intestinal, Cutaneous, Ocular, and Neurological), incubation period in days, person to person contact and prominent clinical signs. (CFSPH, 2022) All of the charted diseases and agents in these charts have technical fact sheets and they may be found at: (Spickler, 2022)

The Center for Food Security and Public Health (CFSPH) at Iowa State University has developed two charts titled “USDA High Consequence Foreign Animal Disease and Pests” which show the disease or agent in tiers ( Tier 1- Tier 3), humans affected, species affected, incubation period, mode of transmission, and prominent clinical signs in animals. (CFSPH, 2022) All of the charted diseases and agents in these charts have technical fact sheets and they may be found at: (Spickler, 2022)

The Center for Food Security and Public Health (CFSPH) at Iowa State University has developed two charts titled “Select Zoonoses of Companion Animals” that show Animal Impact by disease category ( Bacteria, Viruses, Fungi, Parasites) on species with Zoonotic Potential (Dogs, Cats, Birds, Ferrets, Rabbits, Rodents and other), incubation period, and prominent clinical signs. (CFSPH, 2022) All of the charted diseases and agents in these charts have technical fact sheets and they may be found at: (Spickler, 2022)

The Center for Food Security and Public Health (CFSPH) at Iowa State University has developed two charts titled “Select Zoonoses of Companion Animals” that show Human Impact by disease category (Bacteria, Viruses, Fungi, Parasites) , person to person vector transmission, transmission from animals, potential body system affected (Septicemia, Respiratory, Intestinal, Cutaneous, Ocular, Neurological, and Death), incubation period, and prominent clinical signs. (CFSPH, 2022) All of the charted diseases and agents in these charts have technical fact sheets and they may be found at: (Spickler, 2022)[1]

Potential Targets of Agricultural bioterrorism

There are five potential targets of agricultural bioterrorism: field crops; farm animals; food items in the processing or distribution chain; market-ready foods at the wholesale or retail level; and agricultural facilities, including processing plants, storage facilities, wholesale and retail food outlets, elements of the transportation infrastructure, and research laboratories. (Nichols & Carter, 2022) (Parker, 2002) (Wilson, 2000) (Bipartisan Committee on Biodefense, 2022) (Carus, 2015)

Developing a consensus for a list of the major bioterrorist threats and action items is thus the priority in protecting crops and animals. Such a list is necessary to guide the development of surveillance plans, diagnostic tests, and response plans for best containing and eradicating an introduced pathogen. Here is one from the Bipartisan Committee on Biodefense: (Bipartisan Committee on Biodefense, 2022)

■ direct losses of agriculture commodities to diseases

■ costs of diagnosis and surveillance

■ required the destruction of contaminated crops and animals to contain the disease

■ costs of disposal of mortalities and carcasses

■ damage to consumer and public confidence

■ need for long-term quarantine of infected areas

■ losses due to export and trade restrictions

■ disruption of commodity markets.

Containment, Eradication & Control

Introducing exotic pathogens that cause highly contagious animal or plant diseases may elicit rapid and aggressive attempts to contain and eradicate them. Still, these measures cause more economic damage in the short term than the disease itself. Cost may not be the primary factor if the infectious disease becomes endemic. (Howard, 2013)

Containment and eradication of exotic animal diseases are commonly done by culling the potentially exposed animal to break the chain of transmission. (N.M. Ferguson, 2001) Many animal diseases (potential bioterrorist threats) are caused by viruses, for which there are limited therapies once the animal is infected. Fungi cause about 75% of plant diseases. These can be controlled with varying degrees of effectiveness by applying fungicides. (Strange, 1993)

Transmission of bacterial and viral crop diseases is difficult to control with chemical pesticides unless insect vectors transmit the diseases. (Madden & et.al., 2000) Because of these difficulties, containment and eradication of bacteriological pathogens depend heavily on quarantining infected areas and removing infected and exposed plants. (Howard, 2013)

Agricultural Bioterrorist Attack Requires Relatively Little Expertise Or Technology

One of the reasons that a bioterrorist attack on human populations is difficult is that the development of an effective bioweapon is a technically daunting task. Many bioagents are poorly transmitted to humans requiring large amounts to be disseminated to cause mass casualties. The only way to cause mass damage is to use a respirable aerosol. This is also a danger to the perpetrators. (Howard, 2013) (Nichols & Carter, 2022)

The same difficulties do not exist for many of the diseases that would affect agricultural bioterrorist weapons. These diseases of animals and crops are highly contagious and spread effectively from the point source. Moreover, humans can safely handle the causative organisms without risk of infection. There is no need for vaccination, special precautions, or prophylactic antibiotic use. (Howard, 2013) (Nichols & Carter, 2022)

Material to initiate the plant or animal disease outbreak can be produced in small quantities – a few milligrams could be sufficient to initiate multiple outbreaks in widely separated locations. The raw materials can easily be smuggled into the US. They do not even need to be created in a laboratory. (Howard, 2013)

Dissemination requires little experience. Animal virus preparations can be diluted and disseminated with a simple atomizer in close proximity to the animals. Simply exposing a mass of sporulating fungi in the air immediately upward of a target field could be effective for plant diseases. Weather is the only fly in the ointment. One nightmare scenario is the introduction of a pathogen without perpetrators entering the US. Sorghum is planted on both sides of the Southern border, and wheat and barley are along the Canadian – US border. Multiplication of pathogens in the foreign acreage could lead to numbers of spores blowing across the US border and initiating the escalating outbreak. An advantage to the terrorists is that disease surveillance and control programs are less effective/rigorous OCONUS. (Howard, 2013)

BIO-THREATS TO AGRICULTURE – SOLUTIONS FROM SPACE (AGRO-TERRORISM)

Monitoring of plant pathogens

What is needed?

Answer: A real-time monitoring and communication of abnormalities within livestock and crops using satellite technology. Figure 8-1 shows the operating and planned NASA Earth Fleet through 2023. The Landsat series is particularly useful for agricultural bioterrorism studies. (NASA, 2021) 

Figure 8-1 NASA Earth Fleet

Source: (NASA, 2021)

Figure 8-2 Layers of Agriculture Investigation

Source: (NASA, 2021)

Figure 8-2 shows the agriculture density map where satellites must penetrate with MASINT sensors. (NASA, 2021) Figure 8-3 shows the ESA operational plan for its satellites. (ESA, 2019) Figure 8-4 shows the satellites used to help researchers and defense analysts develop intelligence and data for various missions.

Figure 8-3 ESA Developed Earth Observation Missions Pillars

Source: (ESA, 2019)

Figure 8-4 ISR Satellites and their Missions Diversity

Source: (NASA, 2021)

MASINT

Broadband and multispectral methods rely primarily on visible (VIS) and near-infrared (NIR) reflectance indices, such as normalized difference vegetation index (NDVI). Ability to offer passive monitoring for the disease at scale rather than active sampling. A change in plant behavior could show indications of tampering by bad actors when geological and meteorological variables have been accounted for. (Silva & et.al, 2021)

Remote Sensing (RS) is a technique for obtaining information on an object without physical contact by measuring the electromagnetic energy reflected/backscattered or emitted by the surface of the Earth (Freek D. van der Meer, 2007).

“A significant step forward in earth observation was made with the development of imaging spectrometry. Imaging spectrometers measure reflected solar radiance from the Earth in many narrow spectral bands. Such a spectroscopical imaging system can detect subtle absorption bands in the reflectance spectra and measure the reflectance spectra of various objects with very high accuracy. As a result, imaging spectrometry enables better identification of objects at the Earth’s surface and better quantification of the object properties than can be achieved by traditional earth observation sensors such as Landsat TM and SPOT. ” (Freek D. van der Meer, 2007)

As a noncontact technique, we include in the definition of RS also spectral measurements acquired by portable instruments such as handheld spectroradiometers (also called proximal sensing). These measurements are processed and analyzed to retrieve information on the object observed (i.e., plant health, in this case). RS is an indirect assessment technique, able to monitor vegetation conditions from a distance and evaluate the spatial extent and patterns of vegetation characteristics and plant health in this application. Sensors can be distinguished into active or passive; whether they emit artificial radiation and measure the energy reflected or backscattered (active sensors), the reflected solar radiation, or the emitted thermal radiation (passive sensors). (Martinelli, 2015)

 Monitoring of Invasive Plants

Publicly available scientific literature about Agroterrorism, biological crimes, and biological warfare targeting livestock and poultry dates back over 100 years. Copious research reports, peer reviews, books, and studies characterizing bioterrorism risks, threats, impact, and detection methods for/to plant ecosystems and the US economy. They have been published as OSI. Similarly, research reports, papers, and special government studies have been completed detailing effective plant-advanced bioterrorism countermeasures. These are generally CLASSIFIED and not OSI. They will not be addressed in this chapter.[2] [3] We will briefly discuss two interesting OSI / UNCLASSIFIED studies/ examples performed to monitor invasive plants. We will then conclude with a feedlot concern.

The effective and regular remote monitoring of agricultural activity is not always possible in developing countries because access to cloud-based geospatial analysis platforms or expensive high-resolution satellite images is not always available. High-resolution satellite images medium-resolution satellite images were used to map the spatial distribution of sickle bush (Dichrostachys cinerea), an archetypal allochthonous invasive plant in Cuba that is becoming impossible to control owing to its rapid growth in areas planted with sugar cane in the Trinidad-Valle de Los Ingenios area (Cuba), a UNESCO World Heritage Site. (E. Moreno, 2021)

“Two images were used (WorldView-2 and Landsat-8); these were subjected to supervised classification, with accuracy values of 88.7% and 93.7%, respectively. Vegetation cover was first derived from the WorldView-2 image. This information was then used as the training field to obtain spectral signatures from the Landsat-8 image so that Landsat images may be regularly used to monitor D. cinerea infestations. The results obtained in the spatial distribution map for sickle bush in the Landsat-8 images had overall reliability of 93.7% and a Kappa coefficient reliability of 91.9%. These values indicate high confidence in the results, which suggests that sickle bush has invaded 52.7% of the total 46,807.26-ha area of the Trinidad-Valle de Los Ingenios. This process proved extremely effective and demonstrated the benefits of using high-resolution spatial images from which information can be transferred to free satellite images with larger pixel size.” (E. Moreno, 2021)

Another satellite study performed by B. Chen and colleagues. (Chen & et.al., 2019) California’s Central Valley continually faces serious challenges of water scarcity and degraded groundwater quality due to nitrogen leaching. Orchard age is one of the key determinants of fruit and nut production and directly affects consumptive water and fertilizer demand. Chen developed a robust detection method to track crop cover dynamics and identify the planting year through time series of Landsat imagery within the Google Earth Engine (GEE) platform. They used a full archive of Landsat data (Landsat-5 TM, Landsat-7 ETM+, and Landsat-8 OLI) from 1984 to 2017 as inputs and automated the GEE workflow for the on-fly mapping. (Chen & et.al., 2019)

Chen’s method showed very high accuracy in estimating tree crop ages, with an R2 of 0.96 and a mean absolute error of less than half a year, when compared with 142 records provided by almond growers. They further evaluated the accuracy of the statewide mapping of planting years for all fruit and nut trees in California and found an overall agreement of 89.2%. (Chen & et.al., 2019)

Feedlot density detection

The highly concentrated breeding and rearing practices of our livestock industry make it a vulnerable target for terrorists because diseases could spread rapidly and be very difficult to contain. For example, 80 and 90 percent of grain-fed beef cattle production is concentrated in less than 5 percent of the nation’s feedlots. Therefore, deliberately introducing a highly contagious animal disease in a single feedlot could have serious economic consequences. (epidemiology) (Agroterrorism: What Is the Threat and What Can Be Done About It?, 2004)

There is a concern about creating transgenic plant pathogens, pests, or weeds resistant to conventional control methods. This prospect has already been realized through developing a genetically mutant superweed, reportedly resistant to current herbicides. The superweed was reportedly designed to “attack corporate monoculture” and target genetically engineered crops. (Parker, 2002)

According to Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Earth Observation Epidemiology, or tele-epidemiology, is one of the most promising technologies to monitor feedlot density and diseases. Satellite imaging detects the distinct environmental conditions that may serve as a refuge for the disease-carrying animals. Electromagnetic spectra also provide useful information to make decisions regarding plant physiological stress. (Martinelli, 2015) (APHIS & USDA, 2022)

Conclusions

Despite the US’s best efforts, the US will continue to be vulnerable to deliberate introductions of exotic plant and animal diseases by terrorist groups. The vulnerability to agricultural biological attack is a consequence of intrinsically low security of agricultural targets, the technical ease of engagement, and the large economic repercussions of even small outbreaks.

The good news is that the US is aggressively stepping up its ISR efforts via satellite. Satellite intelligence on agricultural and cattle feeding zones reduces the risks of successful attacks.

References

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 Endnotes