Abbreviations and Acronyms
ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS [1] [2]
The following terms are common to the UAS / CUAS /UUV /SPACE industries, general literature, or conferences on UAS/UAV/Drone/UUV/ SPACE systems. A majority of the technical abbreviations come from DRONE DELIVERY OF CBNRECy – DEW WEAPONS Emerging Threats of Mini-Weapons of Mass Destruction and Disruption (WMDD); (Nichols & Sincavage, 2022) (Nichols R. K. et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain, 2019) and (Nichols R. al., Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Technologies, and Operations, 2020) (Nichols & et al., 2020) (Nichols R.et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in Cyber Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets, 2nd Edition, 2019) (Nichols R. K., Chapter 14: Maritime Cybersecurity, 2021) (Nichols & Sincavage, Disruptive Technologies with Applications in Airline, Marine, and Defense Industries, 2021) (Nichols & Ryan, Unmanned Vehicle Systems & Operations on Air, Sea & Land, 2020) (Adamy D. L., Space Electronic Warfare, 2021) (Nichols & Sincavage, 2022)
ABM Anti-ballistic missile
A/C Aircraft (Piloted or unmanned) also A/C
ACAS Airborne Collision Avoidance System
A/CFD Aircraft Flood Denial jamming
ACOUSTIC Detects drones by recognizing unique sounds produced by their motors.
A/D Attack / Defense Scenario Analysis
ADS Air Defense System (USA) / Area Denial System
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast systems
A/C FD Aircraft flood denial
AFRL Air Force Research Lab
A-GPS Assisted GPS
AGL Above ground level
AHI Anomalous Health Incidents
AI Artificial intelligence: “1. a branch of computer science dealing with the
simulation of intelligent behavior in computers, and 2: the capability of a machine
to imitate intelligent human behavior.” (Merriam-Webster, 2020)
AIS Automated Identification System for Collision Avoidance
AMAZE EU’s Additive Manufacturing Aiming Towards Zero Waste and Efficient Production of High-Tech Metal Products project
AMS Autonomous Mobile Sword (SCREAMER) uses sound to disrupt the brain before cutting the enemy to pieces.
AO Area of Operations
AOA Angle of Arrival of signals to GPS receivers / Angle of Attack
AOCS Cooperative Attitude and Orbit Control System takeover
APC Armored personnel carrier
APDS Armor-piercing discarding sabot projectile
APFSDS Armor-piercing fin-stabilized discarding sabot projectile
APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
AR Augmented reality
ARW Anti-radiation weapons
ASAT Anti-satellite weapons / Anti-satellite missile system
ASREN Association of Geospatial Industries, the Arab States Research and Education Network
ASW Anti-Satellite Weapons
ATC Air Traffic Control / Air traffic Control Signals
ATCC Air Traffic Control Center
ATM Air Traffic Management
ATS Air Traffic Services
ATSAW Air Traffic Situational Awareness
AUV Autonomous underwater vehicle
Azimuth The angle between true North and the treat location, in a plane at the satellite perpendicular to the vector from the SVP [Sub-vehicle Point]
Bandwidth is Defined as the Range within a band of wavelengths, frequencies, or energy.
Think of it as a range of radio frequencies occupied by a modulated carrier wave, assigned to a service over which a device can operate. Bandwidth is also a capacity for data transfer of electrical communications systems.
B&B Branch & bound
B.C. Before Christ
BC Ballistic Coefficient
BEAR Battlefield Extraction-Assist Robot
Black Swan Black Swan Event- A black swan is an unpredictable event beyond what is.
Normally expected of a situation and has potentially severe consequences. Black
swan events are characterized by their extreme rarity, severe impact, and the
widespread insistence they were obvious in hindsight.
(Black Swan Definition, 2020)
BLOS Beyond line-of-sight
BPAUV Battlespace Preparation Autonomous Underwater Vehicle
BrO bromine oxide
BSL-4 Biosafety Level #
BTWC Biological & Toxin Weapons Convention
BVLOS Beyond Visual Line-of-Sight operations
BVR Beyond visual range
BW Biological weapons
BYOD Bring your device
C/No Carrier to Noise ratio
c Speed of light ~ (3 x 108 m/s) [186,000 miles per sec] in vacuum named after Celeritas, the Latin word for speed or velocity.
C CLAW Combat Laser assault weapon
cs speed of sound (344 m/s) in air
C2 / C2W Command and control / Command and Control Warfare
C3 Command, control, communications
C3I Command, control, communications, and Intelligence
C4 Command, control, communications, and computers
C4I Command, control, communications and computers, intelligence
C4ISR Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance & reconnaissance
C4ISTAR Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, target
acquisition and reconnaissance
C5I Command, control, communications, computers, Collaboration & Intelligence
CA Collision Avoidance / Clear Acquisition (GPS) / Cyber Assault (aka CyA)
C/A GPS Satellite Course Acquisition unique code
CAA Control Acquisition cyber attack
CAMS Copernicus Atmosphere Monitoring Service
CAS Close Air Support / Common situational awareness
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiation & Nuclear critical infrastructure facilities
CBRNE Chemical, Biological, Radiation, Nuclear & Explosives attacks critical infrastructure facilities or assets
CBRNECy Chemical, Biological, Radiation, Nuclear, Explosives & Cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure facilities or assets
CBW Chemical, Biological Weapons
CCC Circular Cross-Correlation in classical GPS receivers
CC&D Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception
CCTV Closed Circuit Television
CD Collective detection maximum likelihood localization approach (Eichelberger, Robust Global Localization using GPS and Aircraft Signals, 2019)
CD Charge diameters
Cd Drag coefficient
CDC Center for Disease Control
CDMA Code division multiple access protocol
CD Collective detection maximum likelihood localization approach (Eichelberger, 2019)
CE Circular economy
CEA Cyber-electromagnetic activities
CEP Circular error probable
CETC Chinese Electronics Technology Group Corporation
CEW Cyber electronic warfare / Communications electronic warfare
CGA Coast Guard Administration – Singapore
CFSPH Center for Food Security and Public Health (CFSPH)
CHAMP Counter-Electronics High Power Microwave Advanced Missile Project
CHS Cyber-Human Systems
CIA Confidentiality, Integrity & Availability ( standard INFOSEC paradigm)
CI / CyI Critical Infrastructure / Cyber Infiltration
CIA Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability / Central Intelligence Agency
CIRCIA Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act
CIS Critical Infrastructure Sector
CISA Critical Infrastructure Security Agency
CJNG Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación
CM / CyM Countermeasure / Cyber Manipulation
CMADS China’s Microwave Active Denial System
C/NA Communication / Navigation Aid
CNA Computer network attack
CND Computer network deception
CNE Computer network exploitation
CNO Computer network operations
CNS Central nervous system
CO-ASAT Co-orbital (Co-ASAT) missile system
COMINT Communications intelligence
COMJAM Communications Jamming
COMINT Communications Intelligence
COMSEC Communications Security
CONOP(S) Concepts of Operations
CONUS Continental United States
CONV Convergent Technology Dynamics
CONV-CBRN Convergent Technology Dynamics – Chemical, Biological, Radiation & Nuclear
COP Common operating picture
COTS Commercial off-the-shelf
CM Apollo Command Modules
CNPC Control and non-payload links
CPB Charged particle beam
CPS Cyber-physical systems
CR Conflict Resolution / Close range / Cyber Raid (aka CyR)
CSI Crime scene investigation
CSIS Center for strategic and International Studies
CT Counter-Terrorism / Counter-Terrorism Mission
CTN Course -Time Navigation , A-GPS technique which drops the requirement to decode the HOW timestamps from the GPS signals. CTN also refers to a snapshot receiver localization technique measuring sub-millisecond satellite ranges from correlation peaks, like classical GPS receivers.
C-UAS Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (defenses/countermeasures)
CUAV Counter Unmanned Aircraft Vehicle (defenses/countermeasures)
CUES Code for unplanned encounters at sea
CW / CyW Cyber Warfare
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention
CWMD Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Community
CYBER WEAPON Malicious Software and IT systems that, through ICTS networks,
manipulate, deny, disrupt, degrade, or destroy targeted information systems or
networks. It may be deployed via computer, communications, networks, rogue
access points, USBs, acoustically, electronically, and airborne/underwater
unmanned systems & SWARMS. Alternatively, cyber weapons:
- A campaign that may combine multiple malicious programs for espionage, data theft, or sabotage.
- A stealth capability that enables undetected operation within the targeted system over an extended time.
- An attacker with apparent intimate knowledge of details for the workings of the targeted system.
- A special type of computer code to bypass protective cybersecurity technology.
DA-ASAT Direct Accent or Hit-to-Kill (DA-ASAT) missile system
Danger Close
Definition www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2013/May-June/Myer.html Nov 14, 2013 – 1) danger close is included in the “method-of-engagement” line of a call-for-fire request to indicate that friendly forces are close to the target. … Danger close is a term that is exclusive from risk estimate distance (RED) although the RED for 0.1 percent PI is used to define danger close for aircraft delivery. Pi = Probability of incapacitation. 2) Definition of “danger close” (US DoD) In close air support, artillery, mortar, and naval gunfire support fires, it is the term included in the method of engagement segment of a call for fires which indicates that friendly forces are within close proximity of the target.
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
Dazzle Cause temporary blindness with Laser
DCPA Distance between vessels approaching CPA
D&D Denial & deception
DDD Dull, dangerous, and dirty
D/D/D Destruction, Disruption, Deception
DDOS Distributed Denial of Service cyber attack
DEFCON Defense condition
DEW Directed energy weapons (also, DE) (Nichols & Sincavage, 2022)
DF Direction-finding
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOF Degrees of Freedom
DOS Denial of Service attack
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency
DUST Dual-use Science & Technology threat
1090ES – 1090 Extended Squitter Data Link
EA Electronic Attack
Earth Trace The Earth Trace is the locus of latitude and longitude of the SVP as the satellite moves through its orbit
EARSC European Association of Remote Sensing Companies
EBO Effects-based operations
ECCM / EP Electronic counter-countermeasures / Electronic Protection
ECD Dr. Manuel Eichelberger’s advanced implementation of CD to detect & mitigate spoofing attacks on GPS or ADS-B signals (Eichelberger, 2019)
ECCO Estimating the Circulation and Climate of the Ocean
ECM Electronic countermeasures
ECMWF European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts
EHC Extra high voltage
ELINT Electronic Intelligence
ELSA-D Twin small satellite launched in 2020 for End-of-Life-Servicing & Long-Term orbital sustainability
EM Electromagnetic waves
EMC Electromagnetic compatibility
EMD Electromagnetic deception
EMF Electromagnetic field
EMI Electromagnetic interference
EMP Electromagnetic pulse – electromagnetic energy.
EMR Electromagnetic radiation
EMS Electromagnetic spectrum
EO Electro-optical system
EOS Earth Observation Satellites
ESA European Space Agency
ESOC European Space Operations Center located in Darmstadt, Germany
EW Electronic warfare[Legacy EW definitions: EW was classically divided into (Adamy D., EW 101 A First Course in Electronic Warfare, 2001):
- ESM – Electromagnetic Support Measures – the receiving part of EW;
- ECM – Electromagnetic Countermeasures – jamming, chaff, flares used to interfere with operations of radars, military communications, and heat-seeking weapons;
- ECCM -Electronic Counter-Counter Measures – measures are taken to design or operate radars or communications systems to counter the effects of ECM.[1]
Not included in the EW definitions were Anti-radiation Weapons (ARW) and Directed Energy Weapons (DEW).
USA and NATO have updated these categories:
- ES – Electronic warfare Support (old ESM) to monitor the R.F. environment;
- EA – Electronic Attack – the old ECM includes ASW and D.E. weapons; to deny, disrupt, deceive, exploit, and destroy adversary electronic systems.
- EP – Electronic Protection measures – (old ECCM) (Adamy D., EW 101 A First Course in Electronic Warfare, 2001) to guard friendly systems from hostile attacks.[2]
EW Electronic Warfare (EW) is the art and science of denying an enemy the benefits of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) while preserving them for friendly forces. (Wolff, 2022)ES is different from Signal Intelligence (SIGINT). SIGINT comprises Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT). All these fields involve the receiving of enemy transmissions. (Adamy D., EW 101 A First Course in Electronic Warfare, 2001)
EUMETSAT European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites
ESA European Space Energy
FAA Federal Aviation Agency
FDM Fused Deposition Modeling technique
FHSS frequency-hopping spread spectrum
FIRES Definition (US DoD – JP 3-0) is the use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target
FPS Feet Per Second
FY-4 China (FY-4) Lightning Mapping Imager
GAO Government Accountability Office
GCS Ground control station
GEE Google Earth Engine
GEO Group on Earth Observations
GIS Geographical information system
GLM Geostationary Lightning Mappers
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System (GPS, GLONASS, Galileo, Beidou & other regional systems)
GNU GNU / Linux Operating system
GOES R-series Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites (GOES-16 and 17)
GPM Global precipitation measurement
GPS Global Positioning System (US) [3] (USGPO, 2021)
GPS Global Positioning System / Geo-Fencing
GPS/INS uses GPS satellite signals to correct or calibrate a solution from an inertial navigation system (INS). The method applies to any GNSS/INS system
GRU Russian military intelligence branch
GS Ground Station
gSSURGO Gridded Soil Survey Geographic Database
GSFD Ground station flood denial
GSM Global system for mobile communications
GTA Ground-to-Air Defense
Hard damage DEW complete vaporization of a target
HAPS High Altitude Platforms (generally for wireless communications enhancements)
HAPS UAVs UAVs dedicated to HAPS service (example to communicate via CNPC links)
HCM Hypersonic cruise missile
HGV Hypersonic glide vehicle
HEAT High-explosive anti-tank warhead
HEL High energy Laser
HPM High powered microwave
HOW Hand-over-word satellite data timestamp defined in (IS-GPS-200G, 2013)
HTV Hypersonic test vehicle
HUMINT Human Intelligence
HVM Hostile vehicle mitigation
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IC Intelligence community ~ 17 different agencies
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
ICBM Intercontinental ballistic missile
ICS Internet Connection Sharing / Industrial control systems
ICT Information & Communications Technology
ICTS Information & Communications Technology Services
ID Information Dominance / Inspection and Identification /Identification
IDEX International Defense Exhibition and Conference
IDS Intrusion detection system
IED Improvised Explosive Device
IFF Identify Friend or Foe
IIIM International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism
IMU Inertial Measurement Unit
IND Improvised nuclear device
INS Inertial navigation system
INSA Intelligence and National Security Alliance
INFOSEC Information Security
IO /I.O. Information Operations
IoT Internet of things
IIoT Industrial Internet of things
IP Internet protocol
IR Infrared
IS Information security / Islamic State
ISO International Organization Standardization
ISM In-space manufacturing
ISS International Space Station
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)
ISR Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance UAS Platform
ISTAR Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance
IT Information Technology
IT/OT Information Technology/ Operational Technology
ITE Installation, Training, Expense
ITP In trail procedure
IW Information Warfare
JIM Joint Investigative Mechanism
JPL NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory
JSR Jamming-to-signal ratio
KE Kinetic energy
KEW Kinetic energy weapon
K’IHAP Short Shout in Tae Kwon Do
KKW Kinetic Kill Weapon/Warhead
LASER “A laser is a device that emits light through a process of optical amplification based on the stimulated emission of electromagnetic radiation. The term “laser” originated as an acronym for “light amplification by stimulated emission of radiation.” A laser differs from other light sources in that it emits light coherently, spatially, and temporally. Spatial coherence allows a laser to be focused on a tight spot, enabling laser cutting and lithography applications laser cutting and lithography. Spatial coherence also allows a laser beam to stay narrow over great distances (collimation), enabling applications such as laser pointers. Lasers can also have high temporal coherence, which allows them to emit light with a very narrow spectrum, i.e., they can emit a single color of light. Temporal coherence can produce pulses of light as short as a femtosecond. Used: for military and law enforcement devices for marking targets and measuring range and speed.” (Wiki-L, 2018)
LaWS Laser weapon system
LED- Light emitting diodes
LENS Laser-engineered net shaping
LDEF Long Duration Exposure Facility
LGF Low Gradient Furnace
LiDAR Light Detection and Ranging – a RS method using light in the form of a pulsed laser to measure ranges
LOS Line-of-sight / Loss of Signal / Loss of Separation
LLTR Low-level transit route
LM or L.M. Loitering munitions
LMM Lightweight Multi-role Missiles
LPI Low Probability of Intercept
LRAD Long Range Acoustic Device / Long-Range Area Denial [4]
LWSI Livestock weather safety index
M&S Modeling and simulation technologies
Mach 1 Speed of sound, 761.2 mph
MAD Mutually assured destruction
M-ATV Mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicle
MAME Medium altitude medium endurance
MASER Microwave Amplification Stimulated Emission of Radiation
MAST Micro Autonomous Systems & Technology
MEDUSA (Mob Excess Deterrent Using Silent Audio)
MEMS micro-electro-mechanical systems
MIM Man-in-middle attack
MIRV Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles
ML Machine learning
MLAT Multilateration System
MMEVR Multi-Mission Extra Vehicular Robot
MMOD Micrometeoroids and orbital debris
MND Ministry of National Defense
MOA Minute of angle in degrees
MOPP Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) Gear
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
MRVs Multiple Re-entry Vehicles
mTBI mild Traumatic Brain Injury
MRG Europe – Meteosat Third Generation Lightning Imager
MSFC NASA Marshall Space Flight Center
MTI Moving target indicator
MUM-T Manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T)
NAS National Academy Of Sciences
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NASA National Aeronautical and Space Administration
NCSS National Cooperative Soil Survey
NDM Navigation data modification spoofing attack
NDVI Normalized Difference Vegetation Index
NEB New Economic Block soldier
NERC North American Electric Reliability Corporation
NGB National Guard Board
NGO Nongovernmental organization
NHTSA National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
NIEHS National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences
NIR Near Infrared
NKW non-kinetic warfare
NMA Navigation Message Authentication
NO2 Nitrogen dioxide
NOAA National Oceanic & Atmospheric Agency
NV Neurological vulnerability
OCONUS Outside Continental United States
OLI Operational Land Imager
OMAR On-Orbit Manufacture, Assembly and Recycling
OMI Ozone Monitoring Instrument
OODA Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act decision loops
OPCW Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OPSEC Operational Security
OSINT Open-source intelligence (also OSI)
OTH Over-the-horizon
PFMI Pore formation and mobility investigation furnace
PETMAN Humanoid robot developed for US Army -Protection Ensemble Test Mannequin
Phigital Digital and human characteristics & patterns overlap
PII Private identifying information and credentials
PLA Peoples Liberation Army (Chinese)
PLAN Peoples Liberation Army & Navy (Chinese)
PMU Phasor Measurement Unit
PNT Positioning, navigation, and timing systems
POV Point of view
PRAM Photovoltaic Radio-frequency Antenna Module technology
PRN Pseudo-Random Noise
PSA Protective security advisors
PSR Primary Surveillance Radar
PSYOPS Psychological warfare operations
RC Radio communications signals
RCS Radar cross-section
RDD Radiological dispersion device
RF Radio Frequency
RF-EMF Radiofrequency – Electromagnetic field
RFID Radio-frequency identification (tags)
RID Remote identification of ID
RIMPAC Tim of the Pacific
RKA Chinese Relativistic Klystron Amplifier
RN Ryan-Nichols Qualitative Risk Assessment
RNRA Ryan – Nichols Attack / Defense Scenario Risk Assessment for Cyber cases
ROA Remotely operated aircraft
ROC Republic of China
ROV/ROUV Remote operating vehicle / Remotely operated underwater vehicle
RPA Remotely piloted aircraft
RPAS Remotely piloted system
RPO Rendezvous and proximity operations
RPV Remotely piloted vehicle
RS Remote sensing
RSS Received signal strength / Remote Sensing & Surveillance
RTU Remote terminal units
RV Re-entry vehicle
SA Situational Awareness
SAA Sense and Avoid
SAM Surface to Air missile
SAR Synthetic aperture radar
SATINT Satellite intelligence
SATCOM Satellite communications
SBLM Submarine-launched ballistic missile
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems
SCS Shipboard control system (or station) / Stereo Camera System / South China Seas
SDA Space Domain Awareness
SDR Software-defined radio
SEAD Suppression of enemy defenses
SECDEF Secretary of Defense (USA)
SIC Successive Signal Interference Cancellation
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
Signature UAS detection by acoustic, optical, thermal, and radio /radar
SMART Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
SML Space mobility and logistics area support
S/N S / N = is one pulse received signal to noise ratio, dB: Signal to Noise ratio at HAPS receiver (also, SNR)
SO2 Sulfur dioxide
Soft damage DEW disruption to a UAS computer
SOCOM U.S. Army Special Operations Command
SOLAS Safety of Life at Sea (International Maritime Convention) [safety conventions]
SQF Solidification Quench Furnace
Spoofing is A Cyber-weapon attack that generates false signals to replace valid ones. GPS Spoofing is an attack to provide false information to GPS receivers by broadcasting counterfeit signals similar to the original GPS signal or by recording the original GPS signal captured somewhere else at some other time and then retransmitting the signal. The Spoofing Attack causes GPS receivers to provide the wrong information about position
and time. (T.E. Humphrees, 2008) (Tippenhauer & et.al, 2011) (Eichelberger, Robust Global Localization using GPS and Aircraft Signals, 2019) (Nichols & Sincavage, 2022)
Spoofing Alt Def: A Cyber-weapon attack generates false signals to replace valid ones.
SSBN Strategic nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine
SSLT Seamless satellite-lock takeover spoofing attack
SSN Space Surveillance Network
SSR Secondary Surveillance Radar
STEALTH to resist detection
STM Space traffic management
sUAS Small Unmanned Aircraft System
SUBSA Solidification using a Baffle in Sealed Ampoules
SVP Sub-vehicle point – Point on earth’s surface right below the Satellite
SWARM High level, a dangerous collaboration of UAS, UUV, or unmanned boats
T2AR T2 Augmented Reality project
Taiwan ROC Taiwan is officially the Republic of China
TCAS Traffic collision avoidance system
TDOA Time difference of arrival
TEAM (UAS) High-level, a dangerous collaboration of UAS, UUV, or unmanned boats; differs from SWARM in that it has a UAS Team Leader (TL) where SWARM does not. TL directs the UAS team and is the primary counter UAS target to disrupt.
TIROS Television InfraRed Observational Satellite
TNT Trinitrotoluene
TO Theater of Operations
TOA Time of arrival
ToF Time of flight
TRANSEC Transmission security
TTFF Time to first fix (latency)
TTPs Tactic, Technique, and Procedures
Tx Transmit signal
UA Unmanned Aircraft (non-cooperative and potential intruder)
UAM Urban Air Mobile (vehicle)
UAS-p UAS pilot
UAS Unmanned aircraft system (popularly but incorrectly referred to as drones)
UAT Universal access transceiver
UAV Unmanned aerial vehicle / Unmanned autonomous vehicle.
UAV-p UAV pilot
UCAR Unmanned combat armed rotorcraft
UCARS UAV common automated recovery system
UCWA / UA Unintentional cyber warfare attack
UGCS Unmanned Ground Control Station
UGS Unmanned ground-based station
UGT Unmanned ground transport
UGV Unmanned ground vehicle
UHF Ultra-high frequency
UNOOSA The United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs
USDA US Department of Agriculture
USV Unmanned Surface Vessel
UUV Unmanned underwater vehicle
UWB Ultrawideband
VBN Visual-based navigation
VBN LiDAR Visual-based navigation: Light Detection and Ranging – a RS method using light in the form of a pulsed laser to measure ranges
VDL VHF Data link
VI Vegetation Indices
VIEW Virtual Interface Environment Workstation
VIIRS Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite
VIS Visible
VPL Visual Programming Languages
VR Virtual reality
VRT Variable rate technology
VLOS visual line of sight
VTOL Vertical take-off and landing
VX Deadly nerve agent
WAM Wide area multilateration
WFOV Wide field of view
WFUL Wake Forrest University Laboratory
WLAN Wide Local area network
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
WMDD Mini-Weapons of Mass Destruction and Disruption
WMO World Meteorological Organization
XR Extended reality
Special Definitions (Nichols & Carter, 2022) (Nichols R. K., 2020)
Asymmetric warfare can describe a conflict in which the resources of two belligerents differ in essence and, in the struggle, interact and attempt to exploit each other’s characteristic weaknesses. Such struggles often involve strategies and tactics of unconventional warfare, the weaker combatants attempting to use strategy to offset deficiencies in quantity or quality of their forces and equipment. (Thomas, 2010) Such strategies may not necessarily be militarized. (Steponova, 2016)
This contrasts with symmetric warfare, where two powers have comparable military power and resources and rely on similar tactics, differing only in details and execution. (Thomas, 2010)
False Flag Operation – organized spreading of misinformation or disinformation.
Eichelberger Collective Detection (ECD) Definitions / Counter Spoofing Concepts
Acquisition – Acquisition is the process in a GPS receiver that finds the visible satellite signals and detects the delays of the PRN sequences and the Doppler shifts of the signals.
Circular Cross-Correlation (CCC) – In a GPS classical receiver, the circular cross-correlation is a similarity measure between two vectors of length N, circularly shifted by a given displacement d:
N-1
Cxcorr (a, b , d) = ∑ ai dot bI + d mod N Eq. 3-1
I=0
The two vectors are most similar at the displacement d, where the sum (CCC value) is maximum. The vector of CCC values with all N displacements can be efficiently computed by a fast Fourier transform (FFT) in Ớ ( N log N ) time. [3](Eichelberger, Robust Global Localization using GPS and Aircraft Signals, 2019)
Like classical GPS receivers, coarse-Time Navigation (CTN) is a snapshot receiver localization technique that measures sub-millisecond satellite ranges from correlation peaks. (IS-GPS-200G, 2013) [See also expanded definition above.]
Collective Detection (CD) is a maximum likelihood snapshot receiver localization method, which does not determine the arrival time for each satellite but combines all the available information and decides only at the end of the computation. This technique is critical to the (Eichelberger, Robust Global Localization using GPS and Aircraft Signals, 2019) invention to mitigate spoofing attacks on GPS or ADS-B.
Coordinate System – A coordinate system uses an ordered list of coordinates to uniquely describe the location of points in space. The meaning of the coordinates is defined concerning some anchor points. The point with all coordinates being zero is called the origin. [ Examples: terrestrial, Earth-centered, Earth-fixed, ellipsoid, equator, meridian longitude, latitude, geodetic latitude, geocentric latitude, and geoid. [4]
Localization – Process of determining an object’s place concerning some reference, usually coordinate systems. [aka Positioning or Position Fix]
Navigation Data is the data transmitted from satellites, which includes orbit parameters to determine the satellite locations, timestamps of signal transmission, atmospheric delay estimations, and status information of the satellites and GPS as a whole, such as the accuracy and validity of the data. (IS-GPS-200G, 2013) [5]
Pseudo-Random Noise (PRN) sequences are pseudo-random bit strings. Each GPS satellite uses a unique PRN sequence with a length of 1023 bits for its signal transmissions. aka as Gold codes, they have a low cross-correlation with each other. (IS-GPS-200G, 2013)
Snapshot GPS Receiver– A snapshot receiver is a global positioning satellite (GPS) receiver that captures one or a few milliseconds of raw GPS signal for a location fix. (Diggelen, 2009)
Classification of Satellites
Satellites are classified in terms of their purpose and are classified as follows:
Astronomical satellites – observation of distant planets and galaxies;
Biosatellites – carry living organisms to aid scientific experiments;
Communication satellites – communications satellites use geosynchronous or Low Earth orbits to communicate with each other and other systems;
Earth observation satellites (EOS) are satellites intended for non-military uses such as environmental monitoring, meteorology, and producing maps;
Killer satellites are designed to destroy warheads, satellites, and space-based objects;
Navigational satellites use radio time signals transmitted to enable mobile receivers on the ground to determine their exact location. The relatively clear line of sight between the satellites and receivers on the ground allows satellite navigation systems to measure location to accuracies on the order of a few meters in real-time;
Reconnaissance satellites are communications satellites deployed for military or intelligence applications;
Recovery satellites provide a recovery of reconnaissance, biological, space-production, and other payloads from orbit to Earth;
Space stations are orbital structures designed for human beings to live in space. A space station is distinguished from other crewed spacecraft by its lack of major propulsion or landing facilities. Space stations are designed for medium-term living in orbit;
Tether satellites are connected to another satellite by a thin cable called a tether; and
Weather satellites are used to monitor Earth’s weather and climate.
Satellite Orbits
The most common type of orbit is a geocentric orbit, with over 3,000 active artificial satellites orbiting the Earth. Geocentric orbits may be further classified by their altitude, inclination, and eccentricity.
The commonly used altitude classifications of the geocentric orbit are Low Earth Orbit (LEO), Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO), and High Earth Orbit (HEO). Low Earth Orbit is any orbit below 2,000 km, Medium Earth Orbit is any orbit between 2,000 and 36,000 km, and High Earth Orbit is greater than 36,000 km. LLO: low lunar orbit is approximately 100 km above the lunar surface. L1 and L2: “Lagrange points are caused by the balance between the gravitational fields of two large bodies; equilibria between two pulling forces.
Centric classifications
A galactocentric orbit is an orbit around the center of a galaxy.
A heliocentric orbit is an orbit around the Sun. In our Solar System, all planets, comets, and asteroids are in such orbits, as are many artificial satellites and pieces of space debris.
Geocentric orbit is an orbit around Earth, such as the Moon or artificial satellites. Currently, there are over 2,500 active artificial satellites orbiting the Earth.
Altitude classifications
Low Earth Orbit (LEO): Geocentric orbits ranging in altitude from 180 km – to 2,000 km;
Medium Earth Orbit (MEO): Geocentric orbits ranging in altitude from 2,000 km – to 20,000 km;
Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO): Geocentric circular orbit with an altitude of 36,000 km. The orbit period equals one sidereal day, which coincides with the Earth’s rotation period. The speed is 3,075 m/s (10,090 ft/s).
High Earth orbit (HEO): Geocentric orbits above the altitude of a geosynchronous orbit (GEO) > 36,000 km (~ 40,000 km).
Agroterrorism / Bioterrorism Definitions
Agroterrorism is a subset of bioterrorism and is defined as the deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease to generate fear, causing economic losses and/or undermining stability. (O.S. Cupp, 2004)
Bioterrorism is the threat or use of biological agents by individuals or groups motivated by political, religious, ecological, or other ideological objectives.
Earth Observation Epidemiology or tele-epidemiology is defined as ‘using space technology with remote sensing in epidemiology. (Wiki, 2022)
MASINT – Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) is a technical branch of intelligence gathering that detect, track, identify or describe the distinctive characteristics (signatures) of fixed or dynamic target sources. This often includes radar, acoustic, nuclear, chemical, and biological intelligence. MASINT is scientific and technical intelligence derived from the analysis of data obtained from sensing instruments to identify any distinctive features associated with the source, emitter, or sender, to facilitate the latter’s measurement and identification. (Wiki, 2022)
OSI, short for OPEN-SOURCE Intelligence (also known as OSINT), is defined as any intelligence produced from publicly available information that is collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to an appropriate audience to address a specific intelligence requirement. (Bazzell, 2021)
Remote Sensing (RS) uses non-ground-based imaging systems to obtain information about processes and events on Earth. It is unique among the detection and diagnostic methods discussed herein in its ability to offer passive monitoring for the disease at scale rather than active sampling. (Silva & et.al, 2021)
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Endnotes
[1] All Acronyms taken from (Nichols R. K., 2020) and (Nichols & Sincavage, 2022) unless otherwise noted.
[2] EM definitions from (Wolff, 2022)
[3] Ớ = Order of magnitude; dot = dot product for vectors
[4] All these systems are discussed in Chapter 2 of (Eichelberger, Robust Global Localization using GPS and Aircraft Signals, 2019)
[5] Each satellite has a unique 1023-bit PRN sequence, plus some current navigation data, D. Each bit is repeated 20 times for better robustness. Navigation data rate is limited to 50 bit / s. This also limits sending timestamps every 6 seconds, satellite orbit parameters (function of the satellite location over time) only every 30 seconds. As a result, the latency of the first location estimates after turning on a classic receiver, called the time to first fix (TTFF), can be high.
